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Reading Bartleby, Reading Ion 
On a Difference between Agamben and Nancy 
by
G e r t - J a n  v a n  d e r  H e i d e n  (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)
W ithout any doubt, the concept o f the event plays a central role in contem- 
porary thought. This concept obviously has a Heideggerian background, 
and it is introduced in order to describe the ontological realtn opened up 
by the suspension o f the principle of reason. In the work o f Heidegger, this 
principle characterizes metaphysics as ontotheology and guides the meta- 
physical quest for a unifying ground. Although the concept o f the event 
is defined in different ways, as the works of philosophers such as Badiou, 
Meillassoux, Marion, Romano and Agamben demonstrate, they are all vari- 
ations of the same basic idea: the event is without reason and is withdrawn 
from the quest for a unifying ground. This implies that it is unforeseeable, 
unrepeatable or singular, contingent and unmasterable.1 This specific Hei­
deggerian orientation also gives shape to the basic questions that present-day 
ontologies aim to address: how to think being when the idea o f a unifying 
ground is suspended? How to think it in terms of (plural) singularity, un- 
masterability and contingency?
To understand how philosophers approach such questions, one may con- 
sider the stories they read and the characters to which they are drawn. When 
philosophers read literary characters, as Deleuze rightly saw, these characters 
become “personnages conceptuels.”2 They become conceptual characters that 
the philosophers use to develop a conceptual field. Different characters will 
thus inspire various trajectories in the field o f the philosophical problems 
that are under discussion.
1 See, e.c., Te a n - L u c  M a r io n , De surcroït. Études sur les phénomènes saturés, Paris 
2001, p. 37.
2 G il l e s  D e l e u z e / F é l ix  G u a t t a h i , Q u’est-ce que la philosophie?, Paris 2005, 
p. 29.
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In this paper, I will proceed in this way to interrogate how Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Giorgio Agamben address the aforementioned philosophical 
questions.
It is not difticult to identify the concepts they are interested in. Nancy is 
known as a philosopher of plurality, and he always approaches this notion in 
hght o f his key concept of partage or sharing, and its taking place. Agamben, 
on the other hand, can be understood as a philosopher o f potentiality, and 
he explores this concept to understand how one can think the contingency 
o f being. Yet, when lookïng more closely at how they actually develop 
these concepts, we see that both Nancy and Agamben do so in a reading 
of two similar, but nevertheless different literary characters. For Nancy, the 
concept o f partage forms the heart o f his understanding o f the rhapsode Ion 
in Plato’s eponymous dialogue, whereas Agamben develops his account of 
potentiality in a reading o f Herman MelviUe’s character Bardeby, who is a 
scrivener by profession, a copyist o f laws.
These two characters, Ion and Bartleby, are similar because they might 
both be considered to be sons o f Hermes. Where it is the task o f the rhap­
sode to recite the words the poet sang before him, it is the task o f the scrive­
ner to copy the text o f the law already written. Hence, both are engaged 
with the activity of repeating and handing down the words once spoken or 
once written. O f  course, it is quite remarkable that Nancy and Agamben 
choose these figures, whose mam enterprise is found in repetition, to think 
the singular and the unrepeatable.
Despite their similarity, Ion and Bardeby are also different in important 
respects. The rhapsode belongs to the realm of the voice and song. The 
scrivener belongs to the realm o f writing and copying. The rhapsode is an 
enthusiast in the literal sense: his voice communicates a divine potentiahty 
or power (Se loc Siiva^g), as Socrates explains in the Ion.3 This power affects 
the rhapsode and his audience with strong emotions. As Ion says: “W hen I 
teil a sad story, my eyes are full of tears; and when I teil a story that’s fright- 
ening or awfiil, my hair stands on end with fear and my heart jumps.”4 O n 
the other hand, the activity o f the scrivener, as the narrator o f Bartleby, the 
Scrivener informs us, “is a very dull, wearisome, and lethargie affair.”5 W hen 
repeating bis singular words “I would prefer not to” , the scrivener does not 
seem to be affected by anything. “N ot a wrinkle o f agitation rippled him”,
3 P l a t o , Ion 533d; quotadons from Plato’s dialogues are based on: Platonis Opera, ed- 
ited by John Burnet, Oxford 1900—1907. Transktions are taken ftom P l a t o , Complete 
Works, edited by John M. Cooper, Indianapolis 1997.
4 P l a t o , Ion 535c; P l a t o , Works, p. 943.
5 Dan M cCaü (ed.), MelviUe’s Short Novels, N ew York 2002, p. 10.
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the narrator tells us.6 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Melville’s story 
confronts us with the strange circumstance o f a scrivener who interrupts his 
work and gives up copying the law.
In what follows, I will show that Agamben and Nancy read these char- 
acters to examine the unexplored domain that Heidegger opened up by 
his interrogation of the principle of reason. The following questions will 
therefore guide me in the rest of this essay: to which ontological trajecto- 
ries do these characters invite us? How do they conceive the ideas of the 
unmasterable, the singular and the contingent?
1. Sharing the Divine Power
Let us first consider the case o f Nancy and start with the somewhat odd 
question o f why he does not read Bartleby, the Scrivener. I borrow this ques- 
tion from L ’Effet Bartleby, a study that appeared a year ago and that discusses 
the impact o f Bartleby, the Scrivener on contemporary French thought.7 
The author, Gisèle Berkman, wonders why Nancy never wrote on Bar- 
deby despite the fact that philosophers who are very close to him, such 
as Blanchot, Derrida and Agamben, all offer a reading of this character in 
their work. Nancy writes a brief answer, which is added to the book as an 
appendix.8 He notes that the story presents itself as an allegory demanding 
interpretation and, thus, does not present itself as a genuine story that one 
may enter; nor does it present us with characters we can encounter. He adds 
that Bardeby s famous formula “I would prefer not to” is too calculated for 
his taste and that the work of the copyist does not communicate with any 
kind of social life.9
Although one need not agree with this account o f Bardeby, it is perhaps 
not very surprising that Nancy finds it difficult to rclate to Bardeby. The 
social dimension, understood as being-widx, forms the core o f many of 
Nancy’s reflections, and it is exacdy from these forms o f sociability that 
Bardeby radically withdraws himself. The formula “I would prefer not to”, 
as many have noted, coimnunicates nothing. In this sense, Bardeby presents 
an interruption or a hmit case of the social dimension o f being-with or 
being-in-common with which Nancy’s work is so often concerned. How
6 McCaU, Melville’s Short Novels, p. 11.
7 G is è l e  B e r k m a n , L’E ffe t B artleby. Philosophes L ec te u rs , Paris 2 0 1 1 .
8 S e e  B e r k m a n ,  L’E ffe t  B a rd e b y , pp. 179-181.
’ Nancy even writes that the story is in a certain sensc withdrawn from literature: “Elle 
me donne 1’impression d’être écrite pour être commentée et interpretée, ce qui pour moi 
la retire de la littérature en quelque sorte.” (B e r k m a n , L’Effet Bartleby, p. 180).
to communicate with this strange, solitary Bartleby that presents us with an 
utter lack o f communication o f messages, emotions and will? One might 
say that in opposition to the basic partage, the sharing and dividing that pre- 
figures Nancy’s interpretation of being as being-with and as being singular 
plural, the character o f Bartleby rather invites us to think a non-partage,
This latter term is borrowed from Derrida who uses it in the immedi- 
ate context o f his reference to Bartleby in Donner la mort.10 Commenting 
on Kierkegaard’s reading of the story o f the sacrifice o f Isaac by his father 
Abraham in Fear and Trembling, Derrida notes that Kierkegaard character- 
izes Abraham’s words as a form of glossolalia: Abraham speaks in a strange 
tongue. This is a language, as Derrida explains, in which nobody can share. 
H e compares this way of speaking with Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” . 
This phrase, as he writes, “n ’énonce rien qui soit arête, déterminable, positif 
ou négative.”11 According to Derrida, Abraham’s as well as Bardeby s voice 
expresses a language in which others do not and cannot share.
W hile this clearly indicates why Nancy may feel foreign to Bartleby, the 
Scrivener, he does not feel foreign to one of his literary family members, 
namely the rhapsode lon. Nancy engages with this rhapsode in his early 
text Le partage des voix.12 In this text, he criticizes especially Ricceur’s and 
to a lesser degree also Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutics in light o f 
Heidegger’s brief comments on hermeneutics in his dialogue Aus einem 
Gesprach von der Sprache. In this dialogue, Heidegger famously distinguishes 
between the meaning o f hermeneutics as Auslegung or expHcation and the 
more original meaning of the Greek verb spfjiï]veuet,v as the bringing o f a 
message that conditions every explication, and which Heidegger traces in 
Plato’s dialogue Ion.13 Nancy elaborates this suggestion in an extensive read­
ing o f the Ion in which he aims to trace this double meaning of sp(j.Y],v eó e iv  
in the form of a hierarchy between announcement and expHcation. This 
hierarchy corresponds to the distinction between signification and sig- 
nificance (signijiance), which he introducés in L ’Oubli de la philosophie,14 
While interpretation in a Ricceurian sense would adhere to a signification
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10 J a c q u e s  D e r r i d a ,  Donner la mort, Paris 1999, pp. 104-106.
11 D e r r i d a ,  D onner la mort, p. 106.
12 J e a n - L u c  N a n c y , Le Partage des voix, Paris 1982, pp. 51—90. Many other ques- 
tioris and points o f  critique may be raised in relation to  Nancy’s reading o f the Ion than the 
one I present here. For a critique o f  Nancy’s understanding o f IpfjLïjvsusLV, cf. M ic h a e l  
N a a s , Urania — The Only Real Muse? Conversation with Jean-Luc Nancy on the Plural- 
ity o f  Genres, in: Internationales Jahrbuch fïir Hermeneutik 3 (2004), pp. 1—22.
13 See M a r t in  H e id e g g e r , Aus einem Gesprach von der Sprache, in: Unterwegs 
zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe volume 12, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, 
FrankEurt am Main 1985, pp. 79-146, here p. 115.
14 J e a n - L u c  N a n c y , L’Oubli de la philosophie, Paris 1986, pp. 32—33.
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that is presupposed, interpretation in the sense o f a primary spfjnrjveueiv as 
announcement is the very disdosure o f the realm o f significance in which 
people share and which is the presupposition o f every explication o f a par- 
ticular signification. In Le partage des voix, Nancy aims to make this realm 
o f significance manifest by means o f a reading of the lon. Let me discuss 
tliis in three steps.
First, in the Ion, Socrates uses the famous figure o f the iron rings that 
transmit a magnetic force to undcrstand the activity o f poets and rhap- 
sodes.15 The poet does not transmit something he understands; rather he 
transmits a divine power — Siivafju.?.16 The poet and the rhapsode do 
not first and foremost communicate a particular signification, but they 
rather bring their audience under the spell o f the same enthusiasm that 
Iets them speak and makes them speak. Thus, the poet is the voice of the 
gods. This constitutes the difference and hierarchy between announcement 
and explication: the latter presupposes the former and the former occurs 
in the form o f the poet’s speaking for the gods in the Ion. This forms the 
background o f Nancy’s understanding o f épjxrjveÜELv as a form o f com- 
munication and transmission. In my third comment, I will discuss how this 
ieads to another conception of the philosophical dialogue as well, since 
Nancy reinterprets the communahty o f the dialogue in terms o f the (poctic) 
sharing o f voices. That is, for him, it is not the subject matter that is being 
discussed that founds the communahty o f the speakers in a dialogue; rather, 
it is a working and active magnetic force that constitutes the communality or 
sharing o f poets, rhapsodes and listeners.
The context in which the notion of partage arises here, also brings into 
play another concept, namely of ban and abandonment, that is used in Le 
partage des voix, and that is here o f special interest since it is not only im- 
mediately related to the question o f ontology, but is also a point o f dispute 
between Nancy and Agamben, as we shall see. Ban and abandonment are 
of central importance in L ’Être abandonné, which is a difficult and dense 
text from the same period as Le partage des voix.17 In this text, Nancy offers
15 See N a n c y , Le Partage des voix, pp. 6 1 -6 2 .
16 See N a n c y , Le Partage des voix, p. 69; P l a t o , Ion 53 3d .
17Je a n -L u c  N a n c y , L’Êtrc abandonné, in: L’Tmpératif catégorique, Paris 1983, 
pp. 139—153. The notion o f  abandonment occurs a number o f times in  Le partage des voix. 
Mostly, it occurs in relation to Heidcggcr’s abandonment o f  the term  “hermeneutics” (cf. 
N a n c y , Le partage des voix, pp. 23, 40-41, 44), but also and more importantly, three 
times in relation to the notion o f partage (cf. N an cy , Le partage des voix, p. 83). In the 
last occurrence, it becomes clear how close the notions o f être abandonné and partage are
connected for Nancy: being is being abandoned, and being abandoned is “être abandonné 
a ce partage” , that is, being is at the mercy of this sharing (Nancy, Le partage des voix, 
p. 83).
an ontological program in which being is no longer “confié a une cause, 
a un moteur, a un principe.”18 That is, according to him, contemporary 
ontology requires the suspension o f the principle o f reason since being can 
no longer be thought as belonging to the realm reigned by this principle. 
Instead, as Nancy suggests, being is now entrusted to abandonment, which 
Nancy introducés as a translation of Heidegger’s Verlassenheit. Hence, the 
concepts of sharing and abandonment together form the heart o f Nancy’s 
understanding o f ontology in which the principle of reason is suspended.
The notion o f abandonment combines two elements, which we can 
easily discern in the poetic activity described in the Ion. W hile the poet is 
under the spell o f a divine power and is always exposed to it, he can never 
grasp or master it; that is, he is abandoned or entrusted to it. Nancy’s ac­
count o f the ban always brings these two meanings into play: to be under 
the spell o f and to be excluded fiom.® In Le partage des voix, the poet is 
excluded from the divine force in a double sense: he does not master it — to 
poeticize is not a form o f artisanship (néyyr^, as Socrates claims — and he 
does not have knowledge (s7uaT7]fi.7]) o f it. The latter does not only mean 
that poets and rhapsodes do not know the topics they address in their song, 
but they also do not know that it is a divine force that acts in them. Only the 
dialogical inquiry of Socrates makes this clear. This is an issue Nancy only 
marginally touches upon, but which I consider to be quite important for the 
Heideggerian tone in which Nancy reads the rhapsodic and poetic activity 
as the announcement o f a divine power: what does it mean that the divine 
force is transmitted like a magnetic force by poets and rhapsodes, but is only 
truly made knoum as divine force in and through Socrates’ inquiry?20 Can we 
truly say that the mere transmission o f this divine power is already the an­
nouncement of this power in its fiall sense? Should we not rather say that this 
divine power works in the poetic activity without being noticecP. Therefore, 
does the announcement o f this force not always require an interruption of 
this normal working o f this force in which it goes unnoticed? I will come 
back to these questions in my third comment.
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13 N a n c y ,  L’Im p é ra ó f  c a té g o riq u e , p. 150.
15 This is also claimed by W b h n e r  H a m a c h e r , O u , séance, touche de Nancy, ici, in: 
O n  Jean-Luc Nancy. The Sense of Philosophy, ed. by Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks 
and Colin Thomas, London 1997, pp. 40-63; here p. 41.
20 In a certain sense, these questions and concerns are close to the ones Naas explored 
in N a a s , Uiania — The Only Real Muse? Conversation with Jean-Luc Nancy on the 
Plurality o f  Genies, pp. 1—22. For Naas, Socrates is the true interpreter because he un- 
derstands. In a more Heideggerian tone o f  voice, one might also say, as I aim to do here, 
that Socrates is the true interpreter because he and he alone makes the divine power as 
such known, rather than merely exposing the others to it as the poet and the rhapsode do 
according to the logic o f the Ion.
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Secondty, Nancy notes that only with the rhapsode is the framework of 
transmission fully disclosed. Whereas one might think that the rhapsode, 
as the interpreter of the poet, is fiirther removed frorn the original divine 
source, Nancy notes that the dialogue never states that the divine force 
decreases when transmitted.21
At this point, Nancy can fiilly develop the concept o f partage. He trans- 
lates the expression Ö eia  fio ip a , divine dispensation, as “partage diviri', that 
is, the divine sharing out in parts.22 The poet’s voice is not the expression 
of a “vouloir-dire" , and not even o f a presupposed divine “vouloir-dire”, but 
it is a partage des voix; it is a voice that communicates and multiplies a divine 
force in a sharing o f voices. In this sense, the rhapsode is not a derivative. 
Rather, by supplementing the poetic voice, the rhapsodic voice shows the 
true nature o f the poetic voice: it is a singular voice that should be un- 
derstood within a plurality of voices. The divine voice is nothing but this 
plurality o f voices.
O f course, one might wonder why Nancy pursues an account of poetry 
in which the poet is denied all forms o f artisanship and knowledge. Can 
one truly say that the poet is without artisanship and can one truly agree 
with Socrates who ironically refers to 'Tynnichus from Chalcis, who appar- 
ently wrote only one poem worth remembering, as the exemplary poet 
to understand what it means to poeticize?23 W hen the divine force indeed 
plays such a huge role and when the poet is indeed such a voice o f the gods, 
does this not mean that the poetic song should be understood as a form of 
gLossolalia, a speaking in strange tongues? Nancy implicidy uses exactly this 
characterization of poetry to show that poetry opens up a realm o f both 
the unmasterable and the singular: there is no poetry in general, and poetry 
exists only in the plurality of singular styles.24 Moreover, as I mentioned 
before, Derrida characterizes the “strange tongue” in which Bardeby and 
Abraham speak as non-partage. The unique contribution o f Nancy’s read- 
ing o f the Ion may consist exacdy in this. Although the poet does not 
simply speak in his own tongue, since he speaks for the gods, this “strange 
tongue” does not lead to non-partage. Rather, it constitutes forms o f shar- 
ing and communication. All are under the spell of the same force, and all 
are entrusted to or “abandoned to this sharing o f voices”, as Nancy writes.
21 See N a n c y , Le Partage des v o ix , p , 69.
22 N a n c y , L e  P a rta g e  des v o ix , p. 66 ; P l a t o , I o n  53 4c; C o o p e r  transla tes th is  as “ d i­
v in e  g ift”  (P l a t o , W o rk s, p . 942). C learly, to  g e t  a  fu ll o v e rv ie w  o f  th e  n o t io n  o f  & eta 
[ io tp a  in  P la to ’s w o rk , o n e  sh o u ld  a d d  a n  analysis o f  th e  o th e r  o c c u rre n c e s  in  P l a t o , 
R e p u b lic  4 9 2 a , 493a; P h a e d o  5 8 e ; P h a e d ru s  2 4 4 c , a n d  o th e rs .
25 S ee  P l a t o , Io n  53 4d .
24 See N a n c y , Le Partage des v o ix , p . 66.
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Hence, the event of the poetic song itself constdtutes what we might call 
the being-in-common or the being singular plural of die sharing of voices. 
Thus, Nancy connects speaking in a strange tongue to partage rather than 
to non-partage; and, in this sense, he prefers Ion to Bartleby.
Thirdly, Nancy uses the poet’s sharing o f voices to characterize what a 
dialogue is. Clearly, the dialogue offers us a model o f logos that is marked 
by a multiplicity of voices and of speakers. Yet, to think this model, he 
transfers the poetic sharing in the divine force to the sharing o f voices in the 
dialogue. The plurality of voices in a dialogue thus mirrors the plurality of 
poetic genres. One might say that the subject matter discussed in a dialogue 
is abandoned to or at the mercy o f the plurality o f voices that constitutes 
the dialogue and that, being in the dialogue together, disclose the force field 
of significance in which a subject matter may be explicated.
This suggestion is both interesting and problematic. It is interesting be- 
cause we see here most clearly in what sense the event o f the poet’s or the 
rhapsode’s song promises to offer an alternative model for thought than the 
one based on a quest for unity and ground. The transference o f the poetic 
model to dialogue also shows how the latter depends on a primordial shar­
ing o f singular voices. In exactly this sense, the application of the notion 
of partage to the dialogue is itself the most basic prefiguration o f Nancy s 
conception o f being-with and being singular plural.
Yet, it remains to be seen how easily one can transfer the strange tongue 
of the poets and rhapsodes to the dialogue. Nancy notes that, in the Ion, 
the sharing o f voices occurs mainly as speaking for someone or something 
else. The poet is the voice of the god and the rhapsode is the voice o f the 
poet. Also, as Nancy notes, Socrates speaks on behalf of others in the Ion. 
In particular, he becomes a rhapsode reciting Homer and interpreting his 
poetry. For Nancy, this shows most clearly how the discourse of philoso- 
phy shares in poetry. Yet is this true? Are there not important differences 
between philosopher and rhapsode?
As Nancy also notes, the philosopher is the one who excels in know- 
ing the truth o f the discourse of the other, which in this case is the poetic 
discourse.25 But this particular enterprise and quality o f the philosopher 
also has impKcations for Socrates’ recitation. W hen he recites, he does 
something different than the rhapsode. W hen Socrates recites, his audience 
is not placed under the spell o f Homer’s poetry and is not at the mercy of 
the divine power that inspires this poetry. Rather, the philosopher aims to 
break the spell — and to “put” his arguments “forward like an incantation”, as
25 N a n c y , L e P a rta g e  des voix, pp. 5 9 -6 0 .
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Socrates puts it in the Republic.26 In this sense, the philosopher offers another 
song. Or, to put it differently, when Socrates recites, his song is not a “nor- 
mal” poetic song in the sense given in the Ion. Both his recitation and the 
dialogue as a whole interrupt the normal transmission o f the “divine power” . 
Thanks to this interruption Socrates shows what poets and rhapsodes do and 
what they cannot do.
In this latter sense, using Agamben’s logic o f the example, we might call 
Socrates’ recitations exemplary.21 Socrates’ recitation is a recitation — one 
among others — but as every example, it is set apart from the others in order 
to show what recitations are and how they “function”. This is exactly what 
Ion never does: while he transmits a divine force, only Socrates makes it 
known as a divine force. Socrates’ rhapsodic activity does not enthraU or 
enchant in the same way since it makes the rule o f this enchantment manifest, 
thus interrupting the ban o f the divine force — even if it is, as the quote 
from the Republic suggests, by bringing into play another incantation. In this 
sense, it might perhaps be better to say that when Socrates recites, he paro­
dies rhapsody, and opens up a sphere o f language beside the Homeric song, 
interrupting its specific ban and enthrallment.28
To summarize, the concept o f partage allows Nancy to tbïnk the repeti- 
tiveness o f the rhapsodic activity in terms of a plurahty o f singularities. This 
is what the sharing of voices means. Each performance o f the song is a 
singular performance. Hence, the rhapsode’s “repetition” does not repeat an 
origin since the divine power is only at work in these performances. Each 
time, the song evokes the divine power and entrusts poets, rhapsodes and 
listeners to it -  addressing them all, without either o f them being its final 
destination. Yet, by his focus on the rhapsode in his explication of partage, 
Nancy does not address the characteristic way in which Socrates questions 
and interrupts the way in which the rhapsode entrusts himself to this &£La 
Sóvautt,?.
26 P l a t o , The Republic 608a; P l a t o ,  W o rk s, p. 1212 .
27 See G io r g io  A g a m b e n , The Coming Community, Minneapolis 1993, pp. 9-11; 
G io r c io  A g a m b e n , The Signature of A ll Things. O n M ethod, N ew  York 2009, pp. 18, 
23-24.
28 O ne might call Socrates’ recitation a parody, in the following sense o f the word: “In 
the case o f  the recitation o f the Homeric poems, when this traditional link is broken and 
the rhapsodes begin to introducé discordant melodies, it is said that they are singing para 
tên êidën, against (or beside) the song. [...] According to this more ancient meaning of 
the term, then, paiody designates the rupturc o f the ‘natuial’ bond between music and 
language, the separation o f song from speech. [...] Breaking this link liberates a para, a 
space beside, in which prose takes its place." (G io r g io  A g a m b e n , Profanations, New 
York 2007, pp, 39-40).
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2. The Angel o f  Contingency
In a completely different setting, far away from enthusiasts and divine pow- 
ers, we find Bartleby, the scrivener who at a certain moment decides “upon 
doing no more writing” .29 Although the scenery is completely different, the 
copyist who gives up copying is, in Agamben’s reading o f Bartleby, the Scrive- 
ner, engaged with similar philosophical problems as the one that we came 
across in Nancy’s reading o f the Ion: How to deactivate the strange relation 
of SuvajXLC to the activity o f reciting and, in Bardeby’s case, to the activity 
o f copying? How to break the ban that also characterizes the work o f the 
copyist? While the rhapsode addresses everyone equally, without addressing 
anyone in particular, the copyist, as we shall see, is concerned with the fact 
that letters address but in their address /ai/ to reach their addressees.30 These 
questions and themes motivate Agamben’s reading of Bartleby, the Scrivener, 
as we can see in Homo Sacer. In this text, he notes that, although Nancy is 
the thinker par excellence of the “ontological structure” o f the ban and the 
abandonment, Nancy’s work lirnits itself to analyzing this structure; it does 
not provide “any way out o f the ban”.31 In the context o f these questions, 
it is Melville s creation Bardeby who, more than others, is concerned with 
the “dissolution o f the ban” and who promises another account o f poten­
tiality.32 So how does Agamben read Bartleby, the Scrivener?
In the first part o f his essay Bartleby, or On Contingency, which is entided 
“The Scribe, or On Creation”, Agamben surveys and describes the philo­
sophical context onto which he will graft the figure o f writing in general 
and o f the odd scrivener Bardeby in particular.33 Summarizing his dense 
argumentation, we find that this philosophical context is marked by two 
important themes.
First, Agamben argues that the scrivener should be understood in relation 
to the important philosophical tradition originating in Aristode’s De Anima 
that describes the intellect (voü?) as a “writing tablet” (ypa^iXTeïov), a
29 McCall, Melville’s Short Novels, p. 21. The title o f  this section is a variation on 
Berkman who calls Agamben’s Bartleby the angel o f  the possible, cf. B e r k m a n , L’Effet 
Bardeby, p. 162.
30 This is also mentioned in Nancy’s charactcrization o f  the transmission of rhapsode 
and the endlessness o f  riiigs that address but w ithout having a final addressee in mind, cf, 
N a n c y , Le partage des voix, p. 70 .
31 G i o r g i ü  A g a m b b n ,  Hom o Sacer, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford 
1998, p. 58.
3i A g a m b e n , Hom o Sacer, p. 48 .
33 G io r g io  A g a m b e n , Bardeby, or O n Contingency, in: Potentialities, translated by 
Daniel Heller-Roazen, New  York 1999, pp. 243—271.
tabula rasa.3'' It is well known which problem Aristode aims to solve with 
this figure. If thought would have a form of its own, it would impose diis 
form on every being it aims to think, thus distorting the form of this being. 
Therefore, thought should have no form o f its own. It is, as Agamben 
writes, “not a thing but a being of pure potentiality”.35 The writing tablet 
is the figure o f this particular potentiahty. Hence, also for Agamben, it is 
the concept o f StivafXL? that is immediately brought into play, even before 
he starts reading Bartleby, the Scriuener, but this potentiality is o f course dif­
ferent from the one Nancy invokes: not a divine power, but a writing tablet.
In relation to other Aristotelian accounts of Suvafxi.?, as the potentiahty 
that fmds its fiilfillment in its actuaÜzadon, the potentiality of the intellect is 
of a different sort for Agamben. Since evcry thought thinks a particular form, 
no thought exhausts this potentiahty. In this sense, every actual thought re- 
fers back to the potentiality of thinking that is always richer than the actual 
thoughts it gives rise to. For Aristode, therefore, the divine culmination 
point o f thought is neither thought that thinks something nor thought that 
thinks nothing, but thought that thinks itself. Yet, as Agamben asks: “How 
can a writing tablet [...] turn back upon itself, impress itself?"36
Secondly, amidst many other comments, Agamben notes that in the course 
o f history, the figure of writing is dominated more and more by the notion 
o f the demiurge-God, the creator. Since the divine act o f creation is an 
act o f the divine intellect, divine creation can be understood “as an act o f 
writing” in the mectieval period.37 For the medieval theologians, God is a 
scribe. In a variation of Heideggcr’s reading of metaphysics as ontotheology, 
Agamben argues that this reinterpretation of the figure o f writing in terms 
of the scribe-creator, that is, in terms o f the unifying ground o f all beings, 
subsumes all forms of potentiahty in the world under the notion of a God 
who is “absolutely without potentiahty” .
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34 A r is t o t l e , De A n im a  4 3 0 a l . A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p . 2 4 4 . See also A g a m b e n , 
The Coming Community, p. 37 .
35 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 245.
36 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 251.
37 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 246. Elsewhere, Agamben hints at a conception o f  ciea- 
tion (which coincides with his conception of existence), in w h ic h  creation is not under­
stood in an ontotheological framework, but rather in the following terms: “Creation — or 
existence — [...] is rather the impotence of God with respect to his own impotence, his 
allowing -  being able to not not-be -  a contingency to be.” (A g a m b e n , The Coming 
Community, p. 32). This, then, implies that God himself is absolute contingency since the 
expression “being able to not not-be” describes exactly the excluded third — "not not-be” 
is no t “to be,” but rather “neither to be nor not to be” -  that is potentiality and which 
he describes as the potential to be and not to be in his essay on Bartleby.
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W hen comparing these two themes -  the writing tablet and the creator 
as a scribe -  one may o f course wonder why Agamben does not pursue the 
motive o f the writing tablet or tabula rasa throughout its entire history, why 
he does not discuss the primacy o f actuahty in Aristotle’s account of the 
divine intellect, and why he privileges the figure o f the scribe to account 
for the motive o f the demiurge in the history of philosophy. However, 
let us limit ourselves to the question of how these two themes situate his 
reading o f Bardeby. Clearly, the motive o f the scribe is immediately related 
to Bartleby, who is the scribe that gives up writing. As Agamben suggests, 
Bartleby is a counter-figure to creation, namely a figure concerned with 
“decreation”. Melville’s story conducts an experiment that examines being 
by placing it in light o f decreation rather than creation, thus aiming to 
render inoperative the motive of creation in ontology. It is this ontological 
commitment o f the story that guides Agamben:
N ot only Science but also poetry and thinking conduct experiments. These experiments 
do not simply concern the truth or falsity o f  hypotheses, the occurrence or nonoccur- 
rence of something, as in scientific experiments; rather, they call into question Being 
itself.38
Agamben uses the second theme — the writing tablet — to identify Bartleby. 
Anticipating his conclusions, he argues already in the first part of his essay 
that when Bartleby stops writing, “the scrivener has become the writing 
tablet; he is now nothing other than his white sheet.”39 Hence, the difficult 
notion o f decreation is interpreted in terms of the relation between poten- 
tiality and actuaÜty: it concerns taking back what is actualized — the letters 
that are written, the beings that are created -  and return potentiality both 
to what is and to what is not.
Although the story does not offer us any conclusive evidence o f why Bar­
deby gives up writing, the narrator gives us a clear hint in the epilogue. He 
informs us about the rumor that Bartleby used to work at the Dead Letter 
Office, which is an office where the letters that could not be delivered to 
their intended addressees are collected and burned. The famous and beau- 
tiful description of the experience to which such a place leads concludes 
the story:
Dead letter! does it not sound like dead men? Conceive a man by nature and misfortune 
prone to a pallid hopelessness, can any business seem more fitted to heighten it than that 
o f  continually handling these dead letters and assorting them for the flames? For by the 
cartload they are annually burned. Sometimes from out o f the fblded paper the pale clerk 
takes a ring: -  the finger it was meant for, perhaps, moulders in the grave; a bank-note sent 
in swiftest charity: -  he whom  it would relieve, nor eats nor hungers any more; pardon
38 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 26 0 .
39 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 254.
104 Gert-Jan van der Heiden
for those who died despairing; hope for those who died unhoping; good tidings for those 
who died stifled by unrelieved calamities.40
Agamben reads this passage in terms o f the philosophical context he dis- 
cussed in the first part o f his essay. W hen writing is the model for creation, 
letters represent what is and what took place, Bardeby, however, experi- 
enced to what extent letters are not only the ciphers o f what is and o f what 
took place, but also of what is not and what did not take place. The banknote 
did not relieve from hunger and the pardon never arrived at those whom it 
could relieve from despair. It is in this sense that actuality does not only refer 
back to its own potentiality to be, but also to its potentiality to not be and 
to what could have been, but was not. Hence, in these philosophical terms, 
Bardeby redirects our attention from what is to what is not.
To elaborate this point in ontological terms, Agamben argues that the 
story o f Bardeby is engaged with an experiment that requires the suspen­
sion o f the principle of reason and interprets being in light o f this suspen­
sion -  the same motive that we found at the heart o f Nancy’s notion of 
abandonment. Agamben elaborates this idea in reference to Leibniz as well 
as to Nietzsche. Let me explain this in some detail.
Leibniz’s principle of reason, as Agamben writes, “has the following 
form: [...] ‘there is a reason for which something does rather than does not 
exist.’”41 Hcnce, this principle expresses how only reason provides a ground 
for the “preference” -  a “rather than” or a being “more powerful” -  of 
being over non-being. In Leibniz’s thought this is also what ultimately 
justifies creation, as we can see in his theodicy. The creator only wills the 
best o f all possible worlds. If we read the narrator’s comments on the Dead 
Letter Office as the modvation o f the scrivener to stop writing, it becomes 
clear to what extent this experiment on potentiality and decreation aims 
to provide an alternative to the framework of Leibniz’s thought on the 
principle o f reason and its application to the creator God in the theodicy. 
Rethinking Leibniz’s description of the creator who now and again revisits 
the immense mausoleum o f possible worlds, once more enjoying his own 
choice, Agamben writes:
It is diffrcult to imagine something more pharisaic than this demiurge, who contemplates 
all uncreated worlds to take delight in his own single choice. For to  do so, he must close 
his own ears to the incessant lamentations that, throughout the infinite chambers o f  this 
Baroque inferno o f  potentiality, arises from everything that could have been but was not, 
from everything that could have been otherwise but had to be sacrificed for the present 
world to be as it is.42
40 M cC ann , Melville’s Short Navels, p. 34.
41 A g a m b e n , Potentialitïes, p. 258.
42 A g a m b e n , Potentialitïes, p. 266.
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The experience to which Bartleby invites us is opposite to this one: he 
draws our attention to what is not. Thus, the story experiments with the 
suspension of the principle of reason, since only this suspension takes away 
the ground for the choice of the creator. The “rather than” loses its ground 
and transforms into a “no more than” . In this way, this suspension inau- 
gurates “a preference and a potentiality that [...] exist, without reason, in 
the indifference between Being and Nothing. [...] it is the mode of Being 
o f potentiality that is purified of all reason.”43 Bartleby s “formula” -  “I 
would prefer not to” —, which affirms no more than rejects, makes this “no 
more than” known. More precisely, it announces and “opens a zone of 
indistinction [...] between the potential to be [...] and the potential not to 
be [...].1,44 Hence, Bardeby is for Agamben a true son o f Hermes, namely 
the messenger and angel of this potentiality.
Whatever this potentiality exactly means, it is clear that we usually call 
something that preserves its potential not to be, contingent. The suspension 
o f the principle o f reason invites us to think being such that it “preserves 
its potential not to be”. To think being as contingent is therefore the onto- 
logical background of the literary experiment Melville conducts. This has 
remarkable consequences, as Agamben informs us: “If Being at all times and 
places preserved its potential not to be, the past itself could in some sense 
be called into question.”45 To understand what it means to give potential­
ity back to the past and to what is actualized Agamben interprets the most 
basic aspect o f Bartleby, namely that he gives up copying and stops repeating 
what is written.
To explain why it is necessary for the copyist to stop writing, Agamben 
refers to what he interprets as the “atheistic version” of Leibniz’s theodicy, 
namely Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return of the same. O f course, one 
can read this notion in different ways, but Agamben interprets the eternal 
return here as a variation of Leibniz’s theodicy in which the difFerence be­
tween the possible world and the actual world is effaced: where the creator 
wills, among the possible worlds, the world that is good, the eternal return 
invites the will to will what was. Agamben commcnts:
43 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 259. This is reminiscerit o f Deleuze’s reading o f Bar­
tleby who refers impBcidy to the same formulation o f Leibniz’s principle and indicates 
that Bartleby reverses it as follows: “Je préférais rien plutót que quelque chose.” (G il l e s  
D e l e u z e , Critique et clinique, Paris 1993, p. 92).
44 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 25 5 .
45 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 261.
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The infinite repetition of what was abandons all its potential not to be. In its obstinate 
copying, as in Aristotle’s contingency, there is no potential not to be. The will to power 
is, in truth, the wiU to will, an eternally repeated action; only as such is it potentialized.46
Although repetition gives potentiality back to the past, since everything that 
once was (actual) will be (or is willed to be) again, the possible is nothing 
but what once was actual. Quoting Benjamin, Agamben comments: “The 
eternal return is copying projected onto the cosmos”.47 In this context, to 
save the potential not to be, the scrivener must stop copying. Here we see, 
as in other texts, the specific messianic motive in Agamben’s work: “if Bar­
tleby is a new Messiah, he comes [...] to save what was not.”48
Although Agamben’s essay brings into play many different authors and 
themes, which makes his text extremely densc and in many respects open- 
ended, it is clear that he aims to think the importance o f  Bardeby s “inter- 
ruption o f writing” in the context o f the role that the figure o f writing has 
for philosophy and how it may orient a present-day ontological inquiries. 
The course from the writing tablet to the scribe, which philosophically 
finds its culmination in the principle o f reason, is put upside down in the 
story o f the scribe who stops writing and thus poses the question o f what 
it means that being is contingent.
3. From Ion to Bartleby
O ur analysis of Nancy’s interpretation o f Ion and Agamben’s account o f 
Bardeby both indicate that these authors are engaged with these literary 
characters in light of an overarching question: what can an ontology be 
that is no longer dominated by a quest for a unifying ground? Yet, their 
explorations of these characters give shape to different trajectories and to 
different concepts.
For Nancy, the notions that are central to an ontology that take the 
Heideggerian inquiry into metaphysics and the abandonment o f being 
(Seinsverlassenheit) seriously are the nodons o f partage and abandonment. It 
is the Ion and its account of the poetic and rhapsodic activity that gives rise 
to these notions in Nancy s work. Clearly, these two concepts allow him 
to think a y.oivóc, an in-common, that is no longer subsumed under a sv, 
a one(ness). Beings “are in common” in the way the poets, rhapsodes and 
hsteners share a divine voice and SóvafJ.^. This power occurs only in and as
46 A g a m b e n ,  Potentialities, p. 268. Agamben rcfers here also to a remark o f  Lcibniz 
that indeed prefigures the idea o f the eternal return o f the same.
47 A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 26 8 .
A g a m b e n , Potentialities, p. 270.
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a sharing o f different voices, but this also means that every singular voice 
is always at the mercy of this sharing: the poet and the rhapsode are under 
the spell o f this sharing and cannot master it. They cannot even think it as a 
divine power. Only Socrates is capable of doing this in his dialogical inquiry 
that interrupts the working o f this power.
While agreeing with Nancy that the structure of abandonment is indeed 
the basic characteristic of our time to think being, Agamben objects that 
Nancy does not offer a way out o f this ban — as Socrates does. As he puts it 
in Homo Sacer, the notion of the ban puts us in a relation o f “force without 
significance” .49 Applied to Nancy’s reading of the Ion, one immediately 
sees how striking this latter formulation is: the divine power itself is with­
out meaning. Since the poet and the rhapsode are banned from it, it is an 
arbitrary force to them and can make them say whatever it wants, This is 
why Socrates’ odd example of the poet Tynnichus from Chalcis, who only 
wrote one poem worth mentioning, is so well chosen. The poet is banned 
from the power that makes him speak; what he says is fully at the mercy of 
the divine power.
Against the background of these questions, Agamben turns to Bartleby in 
which the question of Süvafxti; returns in a completely different form: not 
in the form o f a power that is at work, but in the form of the potentiality 
to write and not to write. W ithin the philosophical framework Agamben 
chooses, it becomes clear that the lack of reason does not necessarily en- 
trust us to a divine power or other forms o f sovereignty, but rather indicates 
that there is no reason why something should happen rather than not hap­
pen -  why one letter should be written rather than another. It is the task 
of thinking to understand being in relation to this primordial potentiality 
to be and not to be.
As I noted in the first part o f this essay, Nancy’s interpretation o f the po- 
etic and rhapsodic èpfnrjveüetv as the announcement o f the divine power is 
problematic: even though poets and rhapsodes transmit this power, they are 
also at its mercy and thus do not simply make it known as such; they only 
expose others to it. As I also noted, it is only Socrates who, by interrupting 
this transmission, truly makes the divine power known as divine power. In 
this constellation we understand in another way why Agamben’s Bardeby 
has to give up writing: only by interrupting his basic activity of handing 
down and by showing that the potential to write is also the potential not to 
write, Bardeby becomes an angel o f Suvotfin;. He does not simply transmit 
this potentiality as power to which the others are subsequently entrusted and 
exposed, but he interrupts its transmission in order to announce SóvajAtg
49 A g a m b e n ,  H om o Sacer, p. 58.
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and contingency itself. Thus, Agamben pushes us to consider another pos- 
sibility, beyond the abandonment of being as Nancy conceives it, namely 
the experimental and speculative possibihty o f a decreation that does not 
abandon the potential not to be.
Summary
Nancy’s reading o f Plato's dialogue the Ion and Agambens reading of MclviUe’s story 
Bartleby, the Scrivener both explore the possibility o f  a present-day ontology starting from 
the suspension o f the principle of reason. Wc have seen that Nancy reads the Ion in order 
to develop the notions o f sharing and abandonment, which form the central concepts 
in his early understanding o f ontology. In addidon, I have argued that Agamben’s read­
ing o f Bartleby, the Scrivener responds to Nancy and dcvelops an account o f potentiality 
and o f contingency that overcome some o f the probleras attached to Nancy’s account 
o f abandonment.
Zusammenfassung
Jean-Luc Nancys Lektüte des platonischen Dialogs Ion und Giorgio Agambcns Lektüre 
der Geschichte Melvilles Bartleby, the Scrivener loten beide gleichertnaüen die Spiclraume 
einer heute noch möglichen Ontologie aus, die mit der Aufhebung des Satzes vom Grund 
bcginnt. In vorliegendem Aufsatz wird gezeigt, dass Nancy Ion m it dem Ziel interpretiert, 
die Begriffc der Teilhabe und der Verlassenheit zu cntfalten, welche die zentralen Begriffc 
seiner frühen Ontologie darstellen. AuBerdem wird aufgewiesen, dass Agambens Lektüre 
von Bartleby, the Scrivener auf Nancy antwortet und dass F.rsterer einen Begriff von 
Potenzialitat und Kontingenz entwickelt, der die Schwicngkeiten, welche mit Nancys 
Begriff der Verlassenheit verknüpft sind, aufzulösen vermag.
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Critical Excess and the Reasonableness 
o f Interpretation1
b y
N i c h o l a s  D a v e y  (University o f  Dundee)
1. Introduction
In Real Presences, George Steiner notes the commonplace “anything can be 
said and, in consequence, written about anything” but then qualifies it with 
the remark, “we scarely pause to observe [...] (the) [...] enigmatic enor- 
mity that inhabits it.”2 “Language,” he argucs, “knows no conceptual, no 
projective finality [...] need halt at no frontier [...] in respect o f conceptual 
and narrative constructs”,3 This, Steiner remarks, is “the open secret which 
hermeneutics and aestherics [...] have laboured to exorcise or to conceal 
from themselves and their clients”.4 O n the other hand, it is precisely “this 
commonplace” which provides such advocates of critical excess and over- 
reading as Slavoj Zizek with a logical warraiit to chaUenge the assumptions 
o f philosophical hermeneutics. The purpose o f this essay is to take pause 
and consider the enigmatic enormity posed by advocates o f overreading and 
critical excess. However, we should in the first instance avoid an obvious 
trap. Titles such as Interpretation and Overinterpretation5 encourage the mis- 
leading impression that there is clear antinomy between the classical herme- 
neutic tradition and its deconstructive and post-modern critics: the former 
yearns for closure o f interpretation in order to discipline the anarchic play 
of surplus meaning whilst the latter endeavours to prolong, if not acceler- 
ate, the pace o f that play to the end of questioning any hint o f canonized 
meaning. Such polarisation blurs all too simply and too conveniendy both
1 T h e  first v e rs io n  o f  th is  p a p e r  was p re se n te d  a t th e  In te rn a tio n a ]  H e rm e n e u tic s  S em i­
nar, A lb e r t-L u d w ig s -U n iv e rs ity  o f  F re ib u rg , 2 9 *  Ju n e -1 *  July, 20 12 .
1 G e o r g e  S t e i n e r ,  R e a l P resen ces , L o n d o n  1990 , p . 53.
3 St e i n e r , R ea l P resen ces , p. 53 .
4 St e i n e r , R ea l P resen ces , p. 61 .
5 U m b e k t o  E c o / R ic h a h d  R o r t y / J o n a t h a n  C u l l e r  e t  a l., In te rp re ta tio n  a n d  
O v e r in te rp re ta t io n , e d ite d  b y  S tefan  C o llin i, C a m b rid g e  2 0 0 2 .
